When Francisco Pizarro divided the spoils of conquest among his 168 soldiers, the settlement included not just gold and silver but people. Eight million of them. The legal mechanism Spain used to distribute this human wealth was called the encomienda — a word that implied responsibility and care but produced something closer to the most lethal forced-labor system the Americas ever generated. In the Potosi silver mines alone, the Indian working population fell from eleven thousand to sixteen hundred in a single century. The people who had given Europe the potato, quinine, cassava, and cotton were being worked to death beneath their own mountains to fund a Spanish empire on the other side of the world.
The conquest of Peru was not primarily a military event. It was a legal one. The military part — Pizarro's 168 soldiers, the trap at Caxamarca, the march to Cuzco, the installation of puppet Incas and their subsequent removal — took a few years. The legal structures that followed, which determined how eight million Peruvians would actually live under Spanish authority, took three centuries to fully develop and never produced anything resembling justice for the people they governed. At the center of those legal structures was the encomienda. The word comes from the Spanish encomendar — to entrust, to commend to someone's care. The system it named was a grant of authority over a specific number of Indians, given by the Spanish crown to a deserving subject, theoretically in exchange for the obligation to provide those Indians with religious instruction, physical protection, and the other benefits of Christian civilization. In practice, the encomienda was a franchise on human beings, fully heritable, tradeable with the land it was attached to, and exercised at whatever level of brutality the local official culture permitted. Understanding the encomienda means understanding something about how the Spanish colonial mind worked. The crown genuinely believed, or at least consistently asserted, that it had a proprietary right over the peoples of the lands it had conquered — derived partly from papal authority that had granted Spain dominion over newly discovered territories, and partly from the theology of just war that held that defeated peoples could legitimately be placed in subjection. What made the encomienda particularly destructive in practice was the gap between what it officially required and what it actually produced, and the systematic unwillingness of every level of the colonial administration to bridge that gap at the expense of the Spaniards who benefited from the system.
The encomienda system was built on the legal premise that the Spanish crown owned the people of its conquered territories and could assign their labor to favored subjects. What it produced in practice was a death rate in mining regions that reduced populations by 80 to 90 percent within a century.
Where It Came From: Columbus and the First Encomiendas
The encomienda was not invented for Peru. It came from the Caribbean, where Columbus had developed it while governing the islands Spain first colonized in the 1490s. In its original Caribbean form it was already a system of coerced labor — particular Indian caciques and their communities were required to cultivate the lands of Spanish colonists. The Spanish colonist got labor; the Indian community got whatever the colonist chose to provide in the way of religious instruction and protection. As the system spread from the Caribbean to Mexico and then to Peru, it evolved in ways that made it consistently more extractive. The legal connection between the encomienda and a specific piece of land was severed — an encomienda of Indians could be granted wholly independently of any territorial grant. This meant that a Spaniard could hold rights over the labor of a community without having any land obligation to those people, without providing them with anything in return for their labor except the theoretical benefit of Christian conversion. The kings of Spain, perpetually short of rewards for their soldiers and courtiers, gave encomiendas freely. Some recipients farmed them out to other Spaniards entirely, becoming absentee proprietors of rights over people they never met. By the time the system arrived in Peru, built into the original partnership agreement between Pizarro, Almagro, and their priest-financier Luque as part of the expected division of spoils, it had evolved from conditional authority into something close to chattel slavery. The repartimiento — the specific assignment of Indians to a given Spaniard — was treated as property. It could be sold with an estate. It could be inherited. The Indians who were the subject of the repartimiento had no say in any of this, no legal standing to contest how they were used, and no reliable authority to appeal to when the system's violence exceeded even its own brutal norms.
The Potosi Mines and the Mathematics of Death
The worst single expression of the encomienda system in Peru was the labor regime in the silver mines of Potosi. The mountain of silver at Potosi — discovered in 1545, in what is now southern Bolivia — was one of the richest mineral deposits ever found, and the Spanish empire organized its finances around the revenue it produced. From the mid-sixteenth century through the seventeenth and into the eighteenth, Potosi silver was the primary currency of the global trade system. The mountain made Spain rich. What it cost the people who worked it was documented in enough detail to constitute one of the most damning indictments of colonial labor practice in the historical record. The labor system at Potosi operated through the mita — a rotational labor draft borrowed from an Inca institution but applied with none of the Inca system's reciprocal obligations. Under the Inca mita, communities contributed labor to public projects in rotation, with the state providing food, tools, and care during the work period. Under the colonial mita, one-seventh of the Indian adult males in the designated recruitment region were required to present themselves at Potosi each year for work assignments. The colonial state provided neither food nor tools — workers were expected to support themselves or be supported by their families, who often had to travel with them. The conditions inside the mountain were lethal by any measure. The altitude of Potosi is around 13,000 feet above sea level — barely enough oxygen for hard physical labor even for acclimatized workers. The mine shafts were dark, unstable, filled with toxic mercury fumes from the amalgamation process used to extract silver from ore, and operating on schedules that left workers underground for days at a stretch. The cold at the surface was extreme. The nutrition available to workers was minimal. At the beginning of the colonial period, eleven thousand Indians worked in the Potosi mines. A century later, sixteen hundred remained. In non-mining districts the Indian population fell to roughly one-tenth of pre-conquest levels. In the coastal valleys where the climate was warmest and where populations had been most dense, the Indians practically died out entirely. By the time the colonial system had run for a century, the agricultural labor of the warm valleys was being performed by African slaves imported across the Atlantic — the indigenous population had been eliminated.
Potosi was the financial engine of the Spanish empire and one of the most lethal workplaces in human history. The Indian working population at the mines fell from eleven thousand to sixteen hundred over a single century of colonial exploitation.